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This work aims to assess whether the hypothesis of endogenous synchronisation of shocks is verified in the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). A state-space model, which yields time-varying coefficients, is estimated with 
structural demand and supply shocks to several European economies and those of Germany, which serves as a 
benchmark country. The goal is to understand to what extent have structural shocks to the German economy become 
more or less correlated with shocks to the other European economies throughout the EMU experience. The study is also 
applied to U.S. regions in order to have a useful standard of comparison. Even though the hypothesis of endogeneity 
cannot be unequivocally corroborated in Europe, I show that there is a large set of EMU member states whose demand 
shocks are becoming increasingly desynchronised with those of Germany. This may cast doubt on the prospects of a 
successful European monetary union as it is today. Moreover, amongst the key findings there is also proof that U.S. 
regions are a much more cohesive economic bloc than European countries.  
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Since the European sovereign debt crisis has been triggered, both policy-makers and an 
increasing share of scholars brought optimum currency area theory (OCA hereafter) to the centre of 
debate. Though the question whether or not the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is an 
optimum currency area has been answered negatively by a large majority of economists
1
, OCA can 
still be convenient to understand how the robustness of the EMU might be improved.  
However, despite its usefulness, there have been significant criticisms to the appropriateness of 
OCA to yield detailed analyses of monetary unions. Firstly, according to Bordo and Jonung (1999), 
the theoretical framework set forth by it is somewhat static and ahistorical and, consequently, it does 
not allow to capture the features of the processes associated with the appearance and dissolution of 
monetary unions. Secondly, and more importantly, OCA is a mere ex-ante cost-and-benefit analysis of 
the suitability of a certain group of countries to form a monetary union. Following the argument put 
forward by Frankel and Rose (1996, 1997), as processes of monetary integration are dynamic ones, the 
criteria laid out by OCA may need to be taken as endogenous to the processes themselves.  
Let us take the example of Portugal and Germany. If shocks to these two countries are negatively 
correlated and the assumption of sticky prices, sluggish labour movements and inexistence of a fiscal 
union holds, a well-informed and knowledgeable economist would certainly advise the Portuguese and 
German Governments not to engage in a monetary union: an autonomous monetary policy, which 
could be used as a means of stabilisation, would simply be too valuable to be forgone in those 
circumstances. Yet, Frankel and Rose drew attention to the fact that as a process of economic and 
monetary integration is fostered, linkages between the involved countries are strengthened - for 
instance, business cycles may become more correlated as countries increase their economic relations. 
Hence, even though Portugal and Germany do not fulfil the OCA criteria a priori, the process of 
economic and monetary integration may actually lead them to fulfil such criteria a posteriori, ergo the 
need to take the latter as endogenous.  
The present dissertation aims to add to the existing literature by appropriately addressing these 
two sources of criticism. On the one hand, it seeks to study whether the assertion related to the 
endogeneity of OCA criteria is valid in the context of the EMU. More specifically, through the 
estimation of a state-space model, which allows for the existence of time-varying coefficients, I intend 
to assess to what extent have shocks to European economies become more or less correlated 
throughout the EMU experience, thus challenging the hypothesis of endogeneity of this specific 
criterion. Such shocks will firstly be obtained through a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) 
                                                          




model with long-run restrictions, as suggested by Blanchard and Quah (1989). On the other, this 
research endeavour aspires to overcome the critique opportunely made by Bordo and Jonung (1999). 
In order to do so, I will employ the same econometric methodology to another monetary union, 
namely that of the U.S.
2
, so it may become possible to compare and to contextualise the results 
obtained for the European countries. A careful analysis of the institutional features of both the EMU 
and the U.S. monetary union will then have to be undertaken, so that the comparison between them 
does not come out as distortive. 
The importance of this work is not just academic. Indeed, as European politicians are nowadays 
struggling to present the right agenda for the future of the EMU, the issue of endogeneity of OCA 
criteria might shed some light on it. If, for example, shocks to the several European economies are 
proven to evolve as country-specific as the process of integration is deepened, EMU will only be 
sustainable and worthful if European leaders are willing to initiate a path of reforms, either in labour 
market or in the use of fiscal policy, that allows countries to balance the loss of autonomous monetary 
and exchange rate policies. So, following the results obtained, I intend to suggest what are the most 
appropriate reforms and measures European policy-makers should adopt in order to improve the 
EMU's robustness, thus contributing to its success and sustainability. 
The remainder of the thesis is then structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the underlying 
theoretical framework of OCA, as well as its empirical applications in the context of the EMU. 
Chapter 3 presents a literature review on the two main topics covered in the dissertation: the 
hypothesis regarding the endogeneity of OCA criteria and the study of correlation of shocks and 
business cycles. Chapter 4 describes both the econometric methodology employed and the dataset. 
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the presentation of the main results of this inquiry. Lastly, conclusions and 
final remarks will appear in Chapter 6. 
  
                                                          
2 The choice was based on two main criteria. Firstly, it seemed appropriate that only monetary unions that most 
resemble the EMU should be chosen. So, following the terminology applied by Bordo and Jonung (1999), since the EMU 
has evolved as a national monetary union - a single monetary authority common to all members of the union - it is only 
logical that the choice should fall on a national monetary union as well, like the U.S.. The second criterion was related to the 
availability of the data. Even though I have thought about expanding the study to Canadian provinces, I could not find the 
required quarterly data on Canada's regions (see Chapter 4). However, I acknowledge that an improvement upon this work of 
mine would be to expand the analysis to other monetary unions, so that other final remarks and comparisons could arise.    
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2. OCA: Theory and evidence in the EMU 
The study of optimum currency areas must be traced back to the pioneer work undertaken by 
Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). They argued that a set of regions should adopt a 
common currency if savings in transaction costs outweigh the rise in adjustment costs or, in other 
words, when gains are larger than losses. Such gains usually arise from the fact that, as countries share 
the same currency, exchange rate fluctuations no longer cause trade disruptions. Therefore, economies 
that benefit most from the monetary integration process are the ones that are more economically 
related in terms of trade, since the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty is much more valued. On 
the other hand, losses emerge from the fact that, when entering a monetary union, countries are no 
longer entitled to have their own monetary and exchange rate policies. So, as countries forgo these 
economic instruments, their ability to deal with country-specific disturbances is weakened.  
Following this argument, one can draw the conclusion that an optimum currency area can only be 
built if the loss of autonomy of monetary and exchange rate policies can be replaced by other 
economic instruments that are able to fulfil stabilisation purposes, thus minimising adjustment costs. 
To accurately illustrate the problem at hand, let us assume that a shock hits aggregate demand 
positively in Germany and negatively in Portugal. Had an optimum currency area been built between 
these two countries and such an asymmetric shock could be tackled with several instruments: fiscal 
transfers could be assigned to Portugal in order to boost its economy or, when facing increasing 
unemployment, Portuguese workers could easily seek job opportunities in Germany's growing labour 
market so that the excess demand for labour in Germany and the excess supply in Portugal could be 
smoothly erased, leading both economies to a new equilibrium.  
Evidence, however, suggests that the EMU is far from an optimum currency area. Even though 
Kenen stated that in an optimum currency area "there must be sufficient occupational mobility to 
reabsorb the labour and capital idled by adverse disturbances" (Kenen 1969, p.50), Gáková and 
Dijkstra (2008) drew attention to the fact that only 0,14% of the working age population of the EU-27 
moved to another country within the EU. More recently, Arpaia, Kiss, Palvolgyi and Turrini (2014) 
pointed out that, in 2013, nearly 4% of the working age population of the EU lived in a different EU 
country than that where they were born, while, for the sake of comparison, 30% of the U.S. working 
age population lived in a region different from their birth one. These figures unmistakably show that 
labour mobility in Europe is still very low and, therefore, they cast doubt on the ability of labour 
movements to function as a proper stabilisation instrument within the EMU.  
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Interestingly, capital flows within the Eurozone displayed the opposite behaviour until the 
outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis
3
. Indeed, Lane (2013) showed that capital flows amongst 
European countries amounted to 40% in 2007, which could be seen as solid proof that financial 
markets at the European level were far more integrated than labour markets. Since then, despite the 
striking plunge of intra-euro-area capital flows that followed the financial turmoil of 2008, the main 
point still holds: capital moves more easily within the EMU than labour. Nevertheless, in the light of 
OCA, such result must be taken cautiously. Even though free mobility of capital might be welfare-
enhancing, when coupled with sluggish labour movements, it may actually emphasize the effects of a 
negative shock. For instance, if Portugal had been negatively hit by the aforementioned country-
specific disturbance, not only would unemployment rise, as capital would also effortlessly flow out of 
the country in search for higher profitability. The Portuguese economy would then be required to 
undertake a much more demanding adjustment process in order to restore its full employment. 
Given the existence of immobile labour, adjustments in productive factors can only be 
automatically sparked if prices and wages are easily adjusted. If wages were flexible, though 
Portuguese unemployed workers would not seize the increasing job opportunities in Germany, wage 
claims in Portugal would reduce. In Germany, on the other hand, the excess demand for labour would 
drive the wage rate up. While in the former case prices would decrease and Portuguese products would 
then become more competitive, the opposite would occur in the latter. So, if wages were flexible 
enough, those adjustments would allow to stimulate demand in Portugal and, therefore, to restore 
equilibrium. Yet, given the immobility of labour in Europe and the existence of sticky prices, 
adjustments in labour markets can only be achieved at the expense of unemployment, which brings 
about social and economic costs that must be taken into account.   
In the absence of an effective and automatic adjustment carried out by productive factors, the use 
of fiscal policy might be the solution for Governments to tackle asymmetric shocks in a monetary 
union. Let us consider the effects of an asymmetric shock affecting Portugal and Germany when fiscal 
policy is driven at the national level. Intuitively, the negative demand shock in Portugal leads to an 
increasing deficit in the Portuguese public accounts, because tax revenues decline and unemployment 
benefits increase. Furthermore, in order to counterbalance the effects of the negative shock, the 
Portuguese Government can be lured to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy that has also a negative 
impact on its budget. However, as long as investors are willing to lend their funds to a Government 
who shares the same currency as trustworthy Germany, the use of a decentralised fiscal policy in a 
monetary union poses no problem. On the contrary, if public debt starts to increase rapidly, investors 
                                                          




will require a higher interest rate to accommodate the increasing risk, making it difficult for the 
negatively hit countries to use sovereign fiscal policy as a means to stabilise the level of output.     
Additionally, since international capital markets have recently shown not to be the best risk-
sharing mechanism, Bordo, Jonung and Markiewicz (2013) claimed that a monetary union, such as the 
EMU, does require a system of interregional transfers which can smoothen the consequences induced 
by asymmetric shocks. According to Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991), such system of fiscal federalism 
can alleviate between one third and one half of a negative shock in the income per capita of a U.S. 
region. So, if an interregional system of payments had been put in practice, an European central 
authority would have automatically redistribute income from growing Germany to the depressed 
Portuguese economy, so that such transfers could partially offset the negative effects of the shock. 
So far, European leaders have failed to take a step forward towards a higher degree of fiscal 
integration and since labour mobility is not sufficiently high to work as a stabilisation tool, countries 
within the EMU cannot cope with negative shocks properly. Following OCA, the conclusion that the 
EMU is not an optimum currency area arises almost inevitably. Nevertheless, though the sluggishness 
of labour movements amongst European countries and the inexistence of a fiscal union move the EMU 
away from being an optimum currency area, synchronisation of shocks and business cycles might 
work in an opposite way. According to Mundell's cost-and-benefit analysis, when economic structures 
of a set of countries are remarkably similar, such that their business cycles are fairly synchronised, 
severe adjustment costs will not be imposed because disturbances are almost the same and, therefore, a 
common monetary policy can be set in order to benefit all members simultaneously: one size fits all. 
However, when countries of a monetary union have their business cycles fully desynchronised - let us 
assume that all shocks that positively affect Germany's demand affect that of Portugal in a negative 
way and vice-versa - adjustment costs are considerably high, since a common monetary policy will 
either be beneficial to stabilise Germany's or Portugal's output, but not both at the same time. 
As it has already been shown that Europe lacks a sufficiently high degree of labour mobility, 
coupled with the widely accepted proposition of price stickiness and the inexistence of a fiscal union, 
it seems reasonable to assume that both synchronisation of shocks and similarities amongst economic 
structures in European economies play a crucial role in assessing the costs associated with the EMU. 
Basically, when shocks that hit EMU countries are positively and significantly correlated, an 
European Central Bank can set a monetary policy that smoothens the effect of common shocks and 
adjustments costs are thereby minimised; conversely, if those disturbances are in fact country-specific 
and asymmetric, a common European monetary policy will be able to stabilise the business cycle in a 
specific country, but it will surely emphasize the effects of the shock in others. Thus, the extent to 
which shocks across the Eurozone are correlated and synchronised is an interesting way to evaluate the 
costs associated with the EMU, as well as the suitability of countries to be part of it.  
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3. Literature Review 
This third chapter surveys the existing literature on the subject of the present thesis. For the 
purpose of comprehension, two sections will be presented. While the first one concerns itself with the 
work that has already been done on the issue of the endogeneity of OCA criteria, the second one is 
related to the study of correlation of shocks and business cycles. 
 
3.1 The hypothesis of endogenous OCA criteria 
For some time now, economists have been relying on the work of Mundell (1961), McKinon 
(1963) and Kenen (1969) - the founding fathers of OCA - to assess whether a given group of countries 
should form a currency union. Following a cost-and-benefit setting, they all argued that countries 
should weigh benefits and costs associated with the entrance in the monetary union and, as long as the 
former are larger than the latter, such entrance would be profitable and, accordingly, advisable.  
As the prospects of an European monetary union started to increase during the early nineties, 
several scholars have turned to this theoretical framework laid out by OCA to address the following 
questions: "is a European monetary union economically justified?", "if so, which countries are more 
likely to benefit the most?" A large empirical literature was then dedicated to measure gains and losses 
associated with the future EMU, so that economists could determine which European countries were 
more suitable to be part of such project.
4
  
Nevertheless, despite their wide acceptance, these works were not free from controversy. In a 
seminal paper, Frankel and Rose (1996) pointed out that "the suitability of European countries for 
EMU cannot be judged on the basis of historical data since the structure of these economies is likely 
to change in the event of EMU" (Frankel and Rose 1996, p. 4). Briefly, following the Lucas critique
5
, 
they acknowledged that a process of monetary integration tends to change the structure of economies 
and, consequently, the suitability of a country to be part of a monetary union can only be rightly 
assessed once the process of integration sparks its effects on the economic structure. This idea would 
later on be corroborated by Frankel and Rose (1997) and Artis (2002). Likewise, Weber (1990) had 
                                                          
4 Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) provided an exhaustive and complete survey of the literature on the subject, as well 
as an agenda for research. 
5 See Lucas (1976). The Lucas critique was named after Robert Lucas' decisive contribution to macroeconomic policy-
making. According to him, one should not expect to accurately predict the economic effects of a given policy based on 
historical data, because the adoption of the policy itself often leads people to act differently, thus distorting the econometric 
model that supports the analysis. 
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already mentioned that, if the Lucas critique holds, the study of the former European Monetary System 
(EMS) would not offer accurate forecasts for a future European monetary union as one could expect.  
The implications of this theory cannot be disregarded. Prior to the paradigm-shifting work of 
Frankel and Rose, scholars often used historical data to determine whether a group of countries should 
embark on a currency union. For instance, if shocks to Portugal and Germany, say, in the past twenty 
years had hardly been correlated, thus suggesting a majority of country-specific disturbances, OCA 
would yield that those two countries should not engage in a monetary integration process, ceteris 
paribus. However, what economists had failed to realise was that the monetary union itself could also 
impact on the correlation of shocks and business cycles, since higher integration influences trade and 
trade itself influences business cycles. Hence, the conclusion that OCA criteria should be taken as 
endogenous is easily drawn, since they evolve alongside the monetary integration process. On a 
similar note, De Grauwe (2013) stated that the major design failures embedded in the EMU were only 
perceived after they had exacerbated the effects of the financial crisis of 2008, because mainstream 
economic theory about optimum currency areas does not take the endogenous dynamics of capitalist 
economies into account. Ex-ante analyses are, for this reason, not the most appropriate ones, because a 
careful assessment of the suitability of a group of countries to be part of a monetary union should 
consider this issue of endogeneity, namely the effects that higher integration triggers on the correlation 
of shocks and business cycles.  
Yet, in order to understand how the correlation of business cycles is likely to evolve in the event 
of a monetary union, one must study the sign of such relationship. Interestingly, two opposite views 
can be found in the literature. On the one hand, there is the so-called European view, named after the 
European Commission's (1990) report "One Market, One Money", crucial to the deepening of the 
integration process in Europe. In it, the EC claimed that the continuing economic and monetary 
integration in Europe would only make the involved countries more alike and, by extension, 
asymmetric shocks would become less important: "Economic integration will make the occurrence of 
country-specific shocks less likely since the product differentiation tends to dominate product 
specialization." (European Commission 1990, p. 136) .  
The theory put forward by the EC can be summarised as follows. Firstly, as a monetary union 
would be built in Europe, trade amongst the involved countries would most certainly increase due to 
savings in transaction costs countries would gain from sharing a common currency. The main 
question, however, rests on the kind of trade that would likely to be created. If, for example, furthering 
integration would lead to inter-industry specialisation - countries exploit their comparative advantages 
and, therefore, each one of them specialises in a certain industry -, then a shock to a specific sector 
would asymmetrically affect the country in which the hit industry would be located. Conversely, if 
trade would tend to evolve according to an intra-industry specialisation pattern - countries exchange 
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products belonging to the same industry -, when a specific sector would be hit by a shock, all countries 
would suffer from it. So, if the argument is clear, one should be able to understand that the occurrence 
of symmetric shocks is larger when deeper integration induces intra-industry trade. Curiously enough, 
this was the view backed by the EC (1990), who argued that, as intra-industry specialisation is 
characterised by the existence of economies of scale and product differentiation, the removal of 
barriers to the full exploitation of these advantages would increase intra-industry trade amongst 
European countries. Therefore, since the completion of the internal market was likely to render the 
effects of industry-specific shocks more symmetric across countries, the Commission was able to 
sustain the positive effects of monetary integration on the correlation of shocks and business cycles. 
So far, several academics have been able to provide empirical support to this European view. 
Using both regional and national data on employment across several European countries, Fatás (1997) 
conclusively showed that the integration process that had been taking place in Europe from 1966 until 
1992 did not favour specialisation at the country level. Moreover, through the estimation of a simple 
econometric model which related bilateral trade intensity and bilateral correlations of real economic 
activity between a set of developed countries, Frankel and Rose (1996, 1997) reported that trade 
linkage amongst two countries is strongly and significantly associated with more tightly correlated 
economic activity between them. The same conclusion was reached by Dées and Zorell (2011), who 
stated that GDP of economies with more intensive bilateral trade move more closely together.    
 Nevertheless, Krugman (1993) offered a second and remarkably different view on the issue. In 
his view, as a process of increasing integration is pushed forward, inter-industry trade increases and, 
therefore, country-specific shocks, which are asymmetric by definition, are more prone to occur. 
Following his argument, a reduction in transaction costs amongst regions "will make it more likely that 
any given degree of external economies will be sufficient to lead to geographical concentration of an 
industry" (Krugman 1993, p. 244) and, by extension, to a rise of inter-industry trade. Basically, 
Krugman argued that, due to furthering integration, the reduction of all sorts of transaction costs would 
only increase comparative advantage some countries already had over others in a specific industry. 
Hence, fostering European economic and monetary integration would lead countries to specialise in a 
particular sector, thus generating increasingly external benefits for firms in that location through 
knowledge spillovers, labour pooling, close proximity of specialised suppliers and economies of scale. 
The specialisation pattern revealed by U.S. regions is, to this extent, an appropriate example to 
follow. For instance, following Krugman (1993), the New England region, and like others in the U.S., 
was extremely specialised. At the time, the export base of the region was concentrated in narrow high 
technology sectors, such as mini-computers, advanced medicine and precision military hardware, 
which tied New England's booms and slumps to the performance of those specific sectors. So, if this 
high degree of specialisation at the regional level was induced by the greater integration of the U.S. 
9 
 
market, as suggested by Krugman, the process of deeper integration in Europe could not be expected 
to yield different results. Therefore, according to this line of thought, as the European monetary 
integration would evolve, specialisation at the country level would increase, as well as inter-industry 
trade and business cycles would become more idiosyncratic and asymmetric, thus jeopardising the 
sustainability of the future European currency area. 
The main argument regarding the endogeneity of OCA criteria seems to be well-established in the 
literature: higher levels of integration do have an impact on the correlation of business cycles, since 
the former tends to boost trade amongst the involved countries. If trade evolves as inter-industry type, 
countries become more specialised in a given industry and their economies are then subject to be hit 
by asymmetric industry-specific shocks. Rather, if trade develops as intra-industry kind, countries 
exchange products of the same industry and, for that reason, sector-specific shocks affect all countries 
equally. If this is the case, countries are more likely to fulfil the criterion of symmetry of shocks for 
entry into a currency area ex-post, instead of ex-ante, as recognised by Frankel and Rose (1996, 1997).  
 
3.2 The correlation of business cycles in the context of OCA 
Following what has been previously buttressed, the correlation of business cycles is an interesting 
way to assess the costs countries bear when they enter a monetary union. The literature on this issue is 
comprehensively enough to include a wide range of empirical approaches to the problem. This should 
not come as a surprise, since by the time a European monetary union started to be regarded as a real 
possibility, economic researchers dedicated their endeavours to quantify both benefits and costs 
stemming from such an ambitious project. Although some authors have also made significant 
contributions in the fields of labour movements and fiscal federalism
6
, a larger share of scholars was 
leaned towards the analysis of correlation of shocks and business cycles across European countries. 
Weber (1990) was, in this regard, one of the first works to be undertaken. His main goal was to 
empirically evaluate the asymmetries that had been revealed by the former EMS and their implications 
to a future European monetary union
7
. In order to accomplish what he had set up for his analysis, 
Weber assessed to what extent European countries that had participated in the EMS since its very 
                                                          
6 On the issue of labour movements, Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Decressin and Fatás (1995) are usually taken as 
important benchmarks. On the other hand, Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) and Bayoumi and Masson (1995) offered very in-
depth insights to a possible fiscal union in Europe.  
7 As mentioned earlier, Weber acknowledged the possible effects of the Lucas critique in the event of a future EMU. 
However, he only wanted to assess the performance of European countries throughout the EMS experience in order to draw 
possible implications for a future currency union in Europe. "(...) it is beyond the scope of this paper to make quantitative 
predictions about the effects of policies under the EMU as opposed to the present EMS system." (Weber 1990, p.5) 
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beginning had their business cycles synchronised. Therefore, he measured the differentials between 
domestic demand and supply (proxied by the growth of retail sales volume indices and the growth of 
industrial production indices, respectively) and monetary base growth and real money growth across 
countries, as well as the variability of nominal and real exchange rates, inflation, nominal and real 
interest rates, real fiscal expenditure, real wages and unemployment and, finally, current account. Even 
though he found that some variables behaved quite symmetrically throughout the EMS experience - to 
wit, nominal and real exchange rates, nominal interest rates, inflation and current account -, some 
disturbing conclusions were still drawn. For instance, not only did he prove that both real wages and 
unemployment behaved in a significantly asymmetric way, thus suggesting the inexistence of a 
cohesive European labour market, as he also highlighted the asymmetric pattern across countries 
revealed by money supply and demand. 
Following this work of Weber, many other scholars have employed different techniques on raw 
economic variables in search of correlation of business cycles across European countries. Beine and 
Hecq (1997) used co-dependence analysis on unemployment and short-run real interest rates, which 
allowed them to account for the existence of long-run relationships between those variables in 
European countries and those of Germany. De Grauwe (1996), on the other hand, drew attention to the 
real interest rate differentials across countries prior to their entrance in the EMU, whereas Eichengreen 
(1991) compared stock price differentials amongst Canadian and European regions in order to realise 
that region-specific shocks were greater in Europe than in Canada.  
More recently, in their quest for betterment and accuracy, authors have changed both their 
measurement procedures as well as the kind of data employed. Wynne and Koo (2000), for instance, 
characterised the degree of synchronisation of business cycles amongst European countries and U.S. 
Federal Reserve districts in terms of the extent to which these cycles were correlated with each other. 
In order to do so, instead of just measuring differentials and standard deviations of the data as a proxy 
for their variability, they computed correlation coefficients of detrended data on output, employment 
and price level. The detrendig procedure used in the analysis was the band-pass (BP) filter, which 
allowed them to obtain cyclical components of those three variables. Amongst their key findings, they 
found empirical support to the idea that there is a considerably higher degree of correlation of business 
cycles in U.S. regions than in European countries: 40% of the pairwise correlations amongst European 
countries were not statistically significant, while for the U.S. Federal Reserve districts that same figure 
only amounted to 4,55% 
8
.  
Despite being more econometrically sophisticated than other works that had already been done on 
the issue of correlation of business cycles, the study of Wynne and Koo was still not able to overcome 
                                                          
8 Calculations of my own, based on Tables 1(a) and 2(a), pp. 352 and 359, respectively.  
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important shortcomings. Indeed, from the point of view of faithfulness to Mundell's analysis, 
measuring the variability or the correlation of observed output movements, as it has been undertaken 
by Weber (1990) and Wynne and Koo (2000), did not allow to disentangle disturbances from 
responses. Let us think about Portugal and Germany, once more. Imagine that before they entered the 
EMU, both countries had been hit by an identical shock. Let us also consider the hypothesis that, for 
some reason, output in Germany was able to return to its initial level more rapidly than in Portugal. 
The correlation between German and Portuguese output is, therefore, quite low, even though both 
economies were hit by a perfectly symmetric shock. Hence, concerning OCA criterion of correlation 
of shocks only, the path revealed by output and other main economic indicators is hardly of any use. 
The most well-known answer to this problem, and which is still regarded as a benchmark on the 
field of OCA criteria, was undertaken by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992a). Using data on output and 
prices spanning the period 1960-1988, and following the long-run restriction suggested by Blanchard 
and Quah (1989) that demand shocks have only a temporary effect on output, they estimated a SVAR 
and thus obtained structural supply and demand shocks to European countries and U.S. regions. 
Disturbances and responses were, this way, disentangled. So, by computing the correlation coefficient 
amongst countries' supply and demand shocks and those of Germany, they were able to acknowledge 
the existence of a core of European countries and a peripheral group. While the core was made up of 
Germany and its closest neighbours (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Denmark) 
due to the high correlation amongst supply and demand disturbances that affected these economies, the 
periphery gathered Portugal, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy and the U.K., whose supply and demand 
shocks were not sufficiently correlated with the ones that hit Germany
9
. Furthermore, they too drew 
the conclusion that shocks to European countries were more idiosyncratic than the ones affecting U.S. 
regions. The same analysis was later on expanded by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992b, 1994) in 
order to include a larger set of countries in the sample, but with remarkably similar conclusions. 
The importance of these works is widely recognised, as well as their implications. On the one 
hand, they have encouraged many other scholars to pursue this line of empirical research. Funke 
(1996), for instance, recovered supply and demand shocks from an estimated SVAR on European 
countries and West Germany länders and computed the correlation coefficient amongst them. Not 
surprisingly, his results "overwhelmingly suggest that West Germany is, regionally, a good deal more 
equal than the EU and therefore a superior candidate for a monetary union (...)". (Funke 1996, p. 
465) On the other, their results emphasized that the European monetary integration process ought to be 
taken cautiously by policy-makers, since a significant share of countries was proven not to be the most 
suitable to be part of a future EMU.  
                                                          
9 Such distinction between European countries was later on operationalised in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997). 
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Since then, most studies on the issue of correlation of shocks and business cycles across European 
economies have improved upon the pioneer work of Bayoumi and Eichengreen, but they have 
invariantly reached the same conclusions. Verhoef (2003) estimated the same SVAR model, but in lieu 
of computing correlation coefficients across countries' disturbances he used principal component 
analysis. Another interesting approach was presented by Chamie et al. (1994), who extracted three 
different kinds of structural shocks from the data: supply- and demand-side, though the latter were 
decomposed into real and nominal sources. Basically, instead of the bivariate SVAR put forward by 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen, they estimated a trivariate system using data on industrial production, the 
consumer price index and the M1 monetary aggregate in a set of European countries and U.S. regions. 
Finally, in order to decompose the previously identified structural disturbances into their unobservable 
symmetric and asymmetric components, they estimated a state-space model.        
Given the scope and desideratum of the present dissertation, the use of an econometric 
methodology like the state-space model, which allows for the existence of time-varying coefficients, is 
certainly one of the most adequate ones. Indeed, if one intends to study the appropriateness of the 
hypothesis regarding the endogeneity of OCA criteria in the context of the EMU, one must have an 
approach that is likely to capture the specific features of the problem at hand. For instance, by 
computing correlation coefficients across structural shocks for a given time period, Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen implicitly assumed that symmetry of disturbances remains fairly constant, when, in fact, 
it may vary throughout time due to the hypothesis of endogeneity of OCA criteria. The process of 
economic and political integration in Europe is an evolutionary one, which is why the correlation of 
business cycles and symmetry of shock cannot be expected to be the same in the early-sixties as in the 
late-eighties. Therefore, a modelling approach which captures the dynamics of the process affecting 
the synchronisation of shocks amongst European countries is, I believe, a necessary improvement that 
must be made upon the work that has already been undertaken. 
Hence, rather than computing static measures of correlation, as it was done in the seminal work of 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen, I will estimate a state-space model on the structural demand and supply 
shocks recovered from the raw data. So, I will purposefully estimate time-varying coefficients in order 
to understand the dynamics of synchronisation and convergence of shocks between European 
countries and those of Germany (the benchmark country) throughout the entire EMU experience. To 
my knowledge, the work that most resembles this of mine was undertaken by Boone (1997). Since 
then, the EMU was already built and put into practice and, consequently, his analysis can be expanded 
in order to investigate to what extent have shocks to European economies become more or less 
correlated throughout the EMU experience, thus properly challenging the hypothesis of endogeneity of 





The purposes of this chapter are twofold. On the one hand, it seeks to present the econometric 
methodology employed; on the other, it aims to provide a description of both the sources and 
properties of the data.  
 
4.1 Econometric methodology 
My point of departure to investigate the endogeneity of OCA criterion regarding the symmetry of 
shocks will be the seminal approach set forth by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992a, 1992b, 1994), 
which enabled them to disentangle shocks and disturbances from raw data. 
I will firstly recover structural demand and supply shocks using a SVAR model, perfectly 
identified with the long-run restrictions suggested by Blanchard and Quah (1989). Such restrictions 
can be easily understood with the familiar aggregate demand and aggregate supply diagram: aggregate 
demand (AD) curve is downward sloping in the output-price plane, whereas the short-run aggregate 
supply (SRAS) curve is upward sloping. The long-run supply (LRAS) curve, on the other hand, is 
vertical in the same plane, thus reflecting the existence of a level of output which ensures full 
employment. For the sake of argument, we can think of an initial situation where the economy is at its 
long-run equilibrium, which is given by the intersection point of these three curves. 
Let us first consider that the economy is permanently hit by a positive demand shock - either an 
expansionary monetary or fiscal policy is adopted or exports suddenly increase, for instance. The 
adjustment process to this disturbance is depicted in Figure 1 of the Appendix. The initial AD curve 
moves to the right and a new macroeconomic equilibrium is attained at a higher level of output and 
prices. Nevertheless, due to the increase in prices, the SRAS curve gradually moves to the left, as 
firms have to bear increasingly higher wages. Therefore, in the long-run, the newly generated AD and 
SRAS curves meet at the initial level of output, which is determined by the vertical LRAS curve, but 
at a higher level of prices. Basically, while the immediate response to a permanent and positive shock 
to aggregate demand is an increase in both output and prices, in the long-run run output is kept 
unchanged at its initial value and only prices increase.  
Let us now simulate the effects of a permanent and positive supply shock to the economy, namely 
a favourable technological discovery which allows a significant raise in productivity. Figure 2 of the 
Appendix graphically presents the adjustment process that follows. The immediate response is a 
rightward movement of both the SRAS and LRAS curves. So, in the long-run, the new equilibrium is 
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reached at a higher level of output and lower prices. Hence, unlike demand shocks, supply-side ones 
have long-run effects on both output and prices. 
The use of a SVAR model, which relies on the above mentioned identification of the shocks, 
clearly fits the main purpose of this thesis, because not only does it allow to study the dynamics of 
disturbances to European economies, as it is also an econometric methodology supported by economic 
reasoning
10
. The econometric procedure is structured as follows. Firstly, let us consider a system 
where the true model of the economy can be represented by an infinite moving average representation 
of a vector of variables 𝑿𝒕 and an equal number of structural shocks 𝝁𝒕. Formally, using the lag 
operator 𝑳, this can be written in the following way: 
𝑋𝑡 = Κ + 𝐴0 𝜇𝑡 + 𝐴1 𝜇𝑡−1 +  𝐴2 𝜇𝑡−2 +  𝐴3 𝜇𝑡−3 +  …    
                                                                                                                                                                         (1.1) 




Vector 𝑿𝒕 comprises the first difference of natural logarithm of both real GDP (∆𝑦𝑡) and prices 
(∆𝑝𝑡)
11
. While ∆𝑦𝑡  can be seen as the real economic growth, ∆𝑝𝑡  yields the inflation rate of the 
economy. On the other hand, 𝚱 is a matrix of constant terms, whereas the elements of matrices 𝑨𝒊 
represent the impulse response functions of the structural shocks to the elements of vector 𝑿𝒕. Matrix 
𝑨𝟏, for instance, comprises the responses in variables of vector 𝑿𝒕 to a shock in period 𝑡 − 1. Finally, 
vector 𝝁𝒕 comprises both demand (𝜇𝐷𝑡) and supply (𝜇𝑆𝑡) shocks, which are structural in the sense that 
they are uncorrelated at all leads and lags. Hence, the model of the economy can be given more 
specifically by the following representation: 
𝑋𝑡 =  Κ +  𝐿




                                                                                                                                                                         (1.2) 
⇔   
∆𝑦𝑡
∆𝑝𝑡
 =   
𝑘11
𝑘21




𝑎11 𝑖 𝑎12 𝑖
𝑎21 𝑖 𝑎22 𝑖




                                                          
10 The identification of the shocks is supported by economic theory, since from the AD-AS model one knows that 
demand shocks have only a temporary effect on output, whereas supply shocks have long-run effects on both output and 
prices. Yet, the use of a SVAR model also has its drawbacks. In one of the first critiques to the use of this estimation tool, 
Lippi and Reichlin (1993) pointed out that the VAR estimation procedure is based on arbitrary assumptions about the 
moving-average representation. However, it is far beyond the scope of this thesis to take it into proper account. 
11 Instead of using prices, Blanchard and Quah (1989) used unemployment to test their long-run restrictions. Personally, 




It is worth mentioning that, in the representation above, 𝑎12 𝑖  is the element in the first row and 
second column of matrix 𝑨𝒊. Furthermore, the premise that demand and supply disturbances are 
assumed to be uncorrelated can be more formally given by the assumption that their variance 
covariance matrix is diagonal, which, for the purpose of convenience, the literature often assumes to 
be the identity matrix: 𝑉𝑎𝑟  𝝁𝒕 = 𝑰. Lastly, according to the long-run restriction put forward by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989), demand-side shocks have only a temporary effect on output. However, 
since output in vector 𝑿𝒕 is written in first difference form, the restriction implies that the cumulative 
effect of demand shocks on the change of output be zero
12




= 0                                                                                                                                                     (2) 
The structural model described by equations (1.1) and (1.2) can be estimated by a Vector 
Autogression, where each element of 𝑿𝒕 is regressed in lagged values of all elements of the vector 
itself. Hence, the following bivariate system is left to be estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS): 
𝑋𝑡 =  𝐷 + 𝐵1 𝑋𝑡−1 +  𝐵2 𝑋𝑡−2 +  …  +  𝐵𝑛  𝑋𝑡−𝑛 +  𝜀𝑡   
=  𝐷 +  𝐿𝑖  𝐵𝑖  𝑋𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                                                                                       (3) 
=  (𝐼 − 𝐵 𝐿 )−1 (𝐷 + 𝜀𝑡)  
=  Λ + 𝜀𝑡  +  Γ1 𝜀𝑡−1  +  Γ2 𝜀𝑡−2  +  Γ3 𝜀𝑡−3 +  (… )  
Equation (3) is then a Vector Autoregressive representation (VAR) of the dynamic structural 
model defined by both equations (1.1) and (1.2). Matrices 𝑫 and 𝑩𝒊 comprise the estimated 
coefficients, whereas 𝜺𝒕 is a 2x1 matrix with the residuals obtained from each of the two equation of 
the system. Let us assume that 𝜺𝒕 =   
𝜀𝑦 𝑡
𝜀𝑝 𝑡
  , where 𝜀𝑦 𝑡  is the residual from the first equation which has 
first difference of output as its dependent variable, while 𝜀𝑝 𝑡  stands for the residual of the second 
equation of the system which has first difference of prices as its dependent variable. The obtained 
residuals need not be uncorrelated between them, as they are a linear combination of all shocks 
affecting the economy. In fact, the estimated variance covariance matrix of 𝜺𝒕 can be simply given by 
𝛀, which is a non-diagonal matrix: 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝜺𝒕 = 𝛀 ≠ 𝑰. 
                                                          
12 From the specification of the model, one is able to understand that the element 𝑎11𝑖 - the upper-left entry (first row, 
first column) of matrix 𝑨𝒊 - yields the effect of a demand shock in ∆𝑦 after 𝑖 periods. So, following the same reasoning, 
 𝑎11𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=0  gives the effect of a demand shock in the actual level of 𝑌 after 𝑘 periods. Therefore, if the restriction states that 
demand shocks have no long-run effects on the level of output, then  𝑎11𝑖 = 0
∞
𝑖=0 .    
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So far, the estimated VAR only allows to obtain the residuals associated with the two equations of 
the system, as well as their variance covariance matrix. So, those residuals 𝜺𝒕 must be converted into 
structural demand and supply shocks. Equations (1.1) and (3) may provide the answer. Indeed, 
comparing those two equations, residuals and structural shocks can be related in the following way: 
𝐴0 𝜇𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡  ⇔   𝜇𝑡 =  𝐴0
−1 𝜀𝑡   ⇔   𝜇𝑡 = 𝐶 𝜀𝑡                                                                                          (4)  
The fact that 𝑨𝟎
−𝟏 = 𝑪 is merely a convenient simplification. If the argument is hitherto clear, one 
should be aware that 𝜺𝒕 and 𝝁𝒕 are both 2x1 matrices and, ergo, matrix 𝑪 must comprise four elements. 
Hence, the main question rests on whether those four elements of 𝑪 can be perfectly identified. If they 
can, then the estimation of the system's residuals is sufficient to recover the required structural shocks. 
From equation (4), the following identity can be drawn: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝐴0 𝜇𝑡 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝜀𝑡  ⇔   𝐴0 𝐴0
′ =  Ω                                                                                                  (5)  
𝑨𝟎
′  is the transpose matrix of 𝑨𝟎. Matrix 𝛀, on the other hand, is the known variance covariance 
matrix of the residuals associated to equation (3). However, though matrix 𝑨𝟎 has four elements, 
matrix 𝛀 can only provide three different ones: the variance of both 𝜀𝑦 𝑡
 and 𝜀𝑝 𝑡
 and the covariance 
between them. A fourth and final restriction must be given by the long-run restriction that demand 
shocks have only a temporary effect on output, which requires that equation (2) be imposed. The 
argument ought to be examined cautiously. Firstly, equations (1.1) and (3) define that 𝐴𝑖 = Γ𝑖𝐴0. 
From equation (2), however, one knows that the upper-left entry of  𝐴𝑖
∞
𝑖=0  is zero, which formally 
gives the long-run restriction put forward by Blanchard and Quah (1989). So, the combination of these 
two last identities yields that the element in the first row and first column of ( Γ𝑖)
∞
𝑖=0 𝐴0 must be zero. 
Since  Γ𝑖
∞
𝑖=0  is estimated by OLS, the required fourth restriction to perfectly identify matrix 𝐴0 is 
thereby given. Ultimately, as 𝑨𝟎 is uniquely identified, so it is matrix 𝑪 and, therefore, the estimation 
of the residuals is a sufficient condition to obtain the structural demand and supply shocks. 
 The recovery of those structural disturbances is, nevertheless, only the first step of the 
econometric methodology employed by the current thesis. Unlike Bayoumi and Eichengreen, who 
computed the correlation coefficient of demand and supply shocks between Germany and the other 
European economies, my analysis aims to embrace the dynamics features associated with the effects of 
furthering integration. Accordingly, since it allows for the existence of time-varying coefficients, the 
use of an econometric methodology like the state-space model is more likely to offer an increasingly 
accurate and dynamic measure of convergence of structural shocks across economies.  
It is important to bear in mind that, even though the econometric methodology employed by the 
current thesis relies on the combination of a SVAR model with a state-space, these are independent 
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from each other. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992a, 1992b), for instance, started their analysis with the 
demand and supply shocks recovered from a SVAR model, but they went on to compute correlations 
coefficients across them. The estimation of a state-space model is simply an improvement upon that 
work, since it offers a more dynamic measure of correlation between the shocks obtained from the 
same SVAR model, thus allowing to have a proper understanding about the hypothesis of endogenous 
OCA criteria.   
The model can be given by the following equations: 
𝑌𝑡
𝑖 =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡  𝑌𝑡
𝑗
+  𝜉𝑡                                                                                                                                  (6) 
𝛼𝑡 =  𝛼𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝛼𝑡                                                                                                                          (7.1) 
𝛽𝑡 =  𝛽𝑡−1 +  𝜂𝛽 𝑡
                                                                                                                         (7.2) 
Equation (6) is labelled the measurement equation of the state-space model, while (7.1) and (7.2) 
are their transitions equations. In (6), 𝑌𝑡
𝑖  is a given variable 𝑌 in country i and period t, which is 
regressed in the same variable 𝑌 in the same period t, but in country j. The last term of the equation - 
𝜉𝑡  - is a white-noise error term, whose mean is thus set equal to zero and its variance constant. On the 
other hand, 𝛼𝑡  and 𝛽𝑡  are both time-varying coefficients, each one of them defined by an autogressive 
process of order one, as showed in (7.1) and (7.2), respectively. So, 𝜂𝛼 𝑡  and 𝜂𝛽 𝑡
 are also white-noise 
residuals - mean zero and constant variance - associated with each transition equation. 
Despite its seemingly simplicity, the underlying estimation procedure of the state-space model is, 
in fact, rather complex. The estimation of the time-varying unobserved parameters of the model relies 
on the Kalman filter, which offers the maximum likelihood estimator for all 𝛼𝑡  and 𝛽𝑡 . A more 
detailed and thorough explanation regarding the procedure implemented by this estimation tool can be 
found in Appendix A of Boone (1997). 
The economic and political implications drawn from this inquiry rely largely on the way the 
model has been built. So, in order to have an unclouded understanding of the subject matter, the 
following interpretation must be borne in mind. For the sake of illustration, let us assume that the 
measurement equation (6) is used to assess the dynamic correlation of supply shocks between Portugal 
and Germany, such that 𝑌𝑡
𝑖 = 𝜇𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝑇  and 𝑌𝑡
𝑗
= 𝜇𝑆𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑅 , where 𝜇𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝑇  and 𝜇𝑆𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑅  stand for the earlier 
obtained structural supply shocks to Portugal and Germany, respectively, in period t.  
According to the hypothesis of endogenous OCA criteria, once Portugal and Germany have 
entered the EMU, the correlation between their shocks would change, which implies an evolution of 
parameter 𝛽 throughout time. Intuitively, if parameter 𝛽 remains fairly constant during the time period 
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which spans the EMU experience, the hypothesis regarding the endogeneity of this specific OCA 
criterion cannot be accepted 
13
. However, if 𝛽 does change, several interpretations can be made in the 
light of the economic theories that have been previously set forth. If parameter 𝛽 tends to decrease, 
supply shocks to Germany become either increasingly insignificant explain supply shocks to Portugal 
- in the case when there is only a movement towards 0 - or fully desynchronised with the latter. One 
way or another, Krugman's negative view on the effects that deeper integration triggers on the 
correlation of shocks and business cycles cannot be rejected and, therefore, the prospects for a 
sustainable and well-succeeded European currency area cannot be grounded in empirical research. 
A more optimistic viewpoint on the effects sparked by furthering integration in Europe can only 
be attained if 𝛽 actually presents a positive trend. If this is the case, when 𝛽 starts to increase as time 
goes by, supply shocks to Germany become progressively more significant to explain supply shocks to 
Portugal and, thus, the so-called European view finds empirical support not to be rejected.  
Although the study focuses on the evolution of 𝛽, parameter 𝛼 can be simply interpreted as a 
measure of exogenous synchronisation, which embodies other possible sources of convergence aside 
from the chosen benchmark country.  
Given the importance of the evolution of parameter 𝛽 to the conclusions regarding the hypothesis 
of endogeneity of OCA criteria, another econometric approach will be implemented in order to 
accurately assess whether 𝛽 has been increasing, decreasing or remaining constant throughout time. 
So, once the state-space model is estimated and the evolution of 𝛽 obtained, I will estimate by OLS the 
following linear equation: 
𝛽𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑡 +  𝜔𝑡                                                                                                                                     (8)  
Equation (8) posits that the earlier obtained parameter 𝛽𝑡  is regressed in a constant term 𝜃0, in a 
trend variable 𝑡 and in a white-noise error term 𝜔𝑡 . The trend variable 𝑡 is defined as 𝑡 =
1, 2, 3, 4,… ,𝑛, where the first period of the samples takes the value 1, the second period takes the 
value 2, until the 𝑛-th period takes the value 𝑛. 
 
                                                          
13 If an optimistic point of view on the effects of the European integration process is accepted a priori, one would 
suggest that parameter 𝛽 should increase over time. However, the hypothesis of endogeneity only requires a change of the 
parameter, it does not specify whether it increases or decreases. The European view would say that increases, while Krugman 
would forecast a decrease. Nevertheless, since my first job is to prove the hypothesis of endogeneity, I can only say that 𝛽 is 




If the coefficient 𝜃1 which is associated to this trend variable is not statistically significant, then 
𝛽𝑡  is assumed to have remained fairly constant at a level of 𝜃0 throughout the analysed time period. 
The hypothesis of endogeneity of the criterion regarding the correlation of shocks can then be rejected. 
Yet, if 𝜃1 is in fact statistically significant, one must conclude for the existence of a certain evolution 
of parameter 𝛽 and, by extension, for the validity of the hypothesis of endogenous OCA criteria. 
Moreover, if this is the case, the European's view will not be rejected if 𝜃1 > 0: parameter 𝛽 has a 
positive and upward trend and, therefore, structural supply shocks to Germany are increasingly prone 
to explain structural supply shocks to Portugal. Conversely, when 𝜃1 is both significant and lower than 
0, Krugman's more pessimistic view on the effects of integration cannot be rejected due to the 
existence of a downward trend of parameter 𝛽.14 
This interpretive reasoning can be applied to the study of convergence of both demand and supply 
shocks. All that is left to do is to define a benchmark country j. Here, I will once again follow the work 
of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992a, 1992b) and choose Germany as a benchmark for the EMU and 
the region of Mid-East for the U.S.
 15
. The results will of course be subject, not only to the choice of 
those benchmarks, but also to the framework laid out by the estimated state-space model. 
Nevertheless, I strongly believe this specification is the one that allows to properly study the problem 
at hand: the introduction of time-varying parameters, instead of static measures of correlation, allows 
to have a better understanding about the endogeneity of symmetry of shocks, while the structure of the 
model determines whether those disturbances tend to become more positively or negatively correlated. 
 
4.2 Data  
Given the scope of the thesis, measures of real economic growth and inflation had to be collected 
for European countries and U.S. regions. However, in order to duly address the main purpose of the 
current dissertation, several important issues regarding the data have to be kept in mind.  
Firstly, it is my intention to have a comprehensive set of European countries, so that the 
hypothesis regarding the endogeneity of OCA criterion can be assessed with as much carefulness as 
                                                          
14 Even though this is a simple and intuitive technique, it also has its drawbacks. Above all, when assessing the 
evolution of parameter 𝛽 through a trend variable, as defined in equation (8), I am not concerned with possible structural 
breaks. In other words, I implicitly assume that coefficient 𝜃1 is always the same. Synchronisation of shocks might have 
happened at a much higher pace during the first years of the EMU, which would be translated into a steeper upward trend. 
However, since synchronisation cannot increase unlimitedly, the slope of an upward trend variable would inevitably have to 
decrease. Yet, the gains stemming from such straightforward econometric technique can outweigh this shortcoming.  
15 As the largest economy of the EMU, Germany has played an important role on the design of the economic and 
institutional features of the currency area, making itself the most obvious candidate for a standard of comparison. The Mid-
East comprises the most important economic and financial centres of the U.S.: New York and District of Columbia. 
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possible. Thus, to analyse the evolution of shocks in Europe, I gathered data from the OECD Quarterly 
National Accounts for fifteen out of the nineteen EMU participants (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Spain), for a set of European countries which could be taken as a control group (Denmark, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) and, finally, for the Euro Area as a whole
16
.  Second, 
the selected time period should comprise the entire EMU experience, but also some years prior to its 
creation. Furthermore, in order to enrich the study with as many observations as possible, quarterly 
data were chosen over annual. The time period ranging between 1997q1 and 2015q4 was the one that, 
not only was available for all the twenty countries that have been selected, but also allowed to comply 
with the two restrictions I had imposed beforehand. Lastly, since vector 𝑿𝒕 comprises measures of real 
economic growth and inflation, the OECD Quarterly National Accounts provided data for the 
seasonally adjusted real GDP and GDP deflator
17
. So, as stated earlier, for each country real economic 
growth and inflation were measured by the first difference of the natural logarithm of real GDP and 
GDP deflator, respectively. This procedure also ensures that the two variables that are fed into vector 
𝑿𝒕 are stationary. The results of the tests which account for the existence of a unit-root in those series 
are reported in the following chapter. 
Before analysing the results obtained from the use of the data, it might be useful to consider it 
prior to any econometric transformation. To that extent, Table 1 provides the correlation coefficients 
of real economic growth and inflation between each European country and Germany in both the full 
period covered by the sample and the period after the country's entrance in the EMU.  
Interestingly, correlations between real economic growth are clearly more significant than 
correlations between inflation. Regarding the former, the results do prove the existence of a core of 
European countries in the sense of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992a, 1992b). Indeed, after their 
entrance in the EMU, countries whose real economic growth follows more closely that of Germany are 
essentially its neighbours (Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands), but also Finland, Italy, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Likewise, Switzerland presents a high correlation coefficient as well, though it 
does not belong to the EMU. Furthermore, Table 1 also reveals the importance of Germany in the 
                                                          
16 Only Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Lithuania were left out. Though the OECD database provides data for 
Luxembourg, there were none spanning the entire chosen time period. Cyprus, Malta and Lithuania, on the other hand, do not 
belong to the OECD and, consequently, it was not possible to collect the required data from the same source. Nevertheless, 
not only are these four countries relatively insignificant in the context of the EMU, as the selected group of countries already 
seems to be reasonably large and diverse. One can also easily realise that the chosen countries have not entered the EMU 
simultaneously. This is actually a strength of this work and does not pose a problem. Firstly, despite the year of entrance in 
the monetary union, shocks can still be recovered for the entire period. Secondly, when the state-space model will be 
estimated, it will be curious to have different years of entrance. Estonia and Latvia have entered the EMU quite recently, for 
instance. Is there already a process of convergence of shocks to Germany taking place? 
17 Following the terminology employed by the used data source, real GDP and GDP deflator are labelled series 
LNBQRSA and DOBSA, respectively.   
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entire Euro Area economy, as the correlation coefficient between their real economic growth is nearly 
0.88 - the highest value in the entire table. 
 
It is worth mentioning that no important conclusions regarding the endogeneity of OCA criteria 
can be drawn from Table 1. On the one hand, the latter presents static measures of correlations, as I 
have called them earlier, which do not fully capture the dynamic features of the economic and 
monetary integration process. On the other hand, given the analysed time period, for most countries 
there is hardly any difference between correlation for the full period and correlations for the period 
Table 1: Correlations between real economic growth and inflation of European countries 
and those of Germany 
 Correlation of real growth to 
Germany 








After entrance in 
EMU 
Austria 0.6558* 0.6792* 0.1733 0.1032 
Belgium 0.6197* 0.6128* -0.1721 -0.2161 
Denmark 0.4349*  -0.1067  
Estonia 0.4633* 0.2261 -0.3158* -0.4362 
Euro Area 0.8762*  0.3416*  
Finland 0.6692* 0.7111* 0.1079 0.2151 
France 0.7181* 0.7446* -0.1813 -0.3725* 
Greece 0.2931* 0.2190 0.1313 0.2127 
Ireland 0.1287 0.0745 -0.1205 -0.0662 
Italy 0.7081* 0.7337* 0.0315 0.0491 
Latvia 0.3448* 0.3202 -0.0881 -0.2214 
the Netherlands 0.6775* 0.7071* -0.1756 -0.1562 
Portugal 0.4106* 0.4233* -0.2686* -0.2261 
Slovakia 0.4261* 0.8838* -0.2530* -0.0637 
Slovenia 0.6115* 0.7728* -0.1866 0.0144 
Spain 0.4111* 0.4085* -0.1807 -0.2249 
Sweden 0.5535*  0.1039  
Switzerland 0.6277*  -0.2761*  
United Kingdom 0.6000*  -0.1628  
 
Notes: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain entered the EMU in 
1999; Greece in 2001; Slovenia in 2007; Slovakia in 2009; Estonia in 2011; Latvia in 2014; Denmark, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom are not part of the EMU.  
Asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance of the coefficients at a 5% level.  
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after the entrance in the EMU. So, the main purpose of Table 1 is to merely illustrate interesting 
properties of the collected European data.    
Finally, since the current thesis also intends to focus on the U.S. monetary union, similar data had 
to be gathered for American regions. To my knowledge, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is 
the most accurate data source to do so. Therefore, I used BEA Regional Accounts to obtain quarterly 
data on nominal and real GDP spanning the period 2005q1-2015q4 for the eight standard regions of 
the U.S. defined by the BEA itself: Far West, Great Lakes, Mid-East, New England, Plains, Rocky 
Mountains, Southeast and Southwest. I also collected the same data for the United States as a whole. 
The recovery of demand and supply shocks requires that both a measure of real economic growth and 
inflation be used. Nevertheless, since a measure of prices is not directly given by BEA to the eight 
regions, I used nominal and real GDP to compute the implicit GDP deflator and, then, wrote the 
former and the latter in the first difference of their natural logarithm in order to put them in vector 𝑿𝒕. 
This procedure is exactly the same as the one that has been applied to European data and allows to 
ensure stationarity of the variables, which can be corroborated by the unit-root tests presented in the 
following chapter. 
 
Following the analysis made to the European dataset, Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients 
between each region's real economic growth and inflation and those of the Mid-East. These figures 
indicate that only Rocky Mountains and the Southwest are not significantly correlated with the Mid-
East, neither on real economic growth nor inflation. Furthermore, Table 2 also shows that, unlike the 
Table 2: Correlations between real economic growth and inflation of U.S. regions and 
those of the Mid-East 
 Correlation of real growth to 
the Mid-East 







Far West 0.3011* 0.7254* 
Great Lakes 0.5345* 0.8934* 
New England 0.5459* 0.9272* 
Plains 0.4021* 0.6733* 
Rocky Mountains -0.0412 -0.0370 
Southeast 0.4100* 0.8743* 
Southwest -0.0431 -0.1404 
United States 0.5746* 0.6160* 
 
Note: Asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance of the coefficients at a 5% level. 
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European case where correlations between inflation are lower when compared to those regarding real 
economic growth, U.S. regions are highly correlated in terms of inflation. Once again, only Rocky 
Mountains and the Southwest reveal a relatively idiosyncratic behaviour, which presumably arises 
from their specific patterns of production (clearly dominated by oil industries in the Southwest and by 
other raw material industries, agriculture and forestry in the Rocky Mountains states). 
Nevertheless, the most striking property offered by the Table concerns the relationship between 
the benchmark region and the United States as a whole. From Table 1, one certainly recalls that the 
highest correlation coefficient to Germany was presented by the Euro Area, which could be read as a 
signal of the enormous importance of the former in the European economy. In Table 2, however, 
correlations between the Mid-East and the entire United States are not as high as those amongst 
Germany and the Euro Area. Even though it is possible to infer that the Mid-East does have a crucial 
role to play in the American economy, the difference between this particular region and the others is 
not that sharp, which prevents the existence of a core and peripheral groups. So, figures from Tables 1 
and 2 show that both real economic growth and inflation are generally more correlated across U.S. 
regions than European countries, as the former are much more alike amongst them than the latter.  
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5. Main results 
This chapter presents the main results that stem from this study. Section 5.1 describes all the steps 
I have gone through in order to recover structural demand and supply shocks. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 
describe the results arising from the estimated state-space model and whether these point to the 
existence of an evolutionary process of (de)synchronisation of demand and supply shocks. Section 5.4 
discusses policy implications that can be drawn for Europe in the light of the results obtained.  
 
5.1 Demand and supply shocks  
The first step of the econometric methodology employed required that demand- and supply-side 
shocks, as identified by Blanchard and Quah (1989), were recovered from the data. In order to do so, 
the data on real GDP and GDP deflator for European countries and U.S. regions were written in first 
difference of their natural logarithm, thus becoming stationary variables that could be interpreted as 
real economic growth and inflation, respectively. To check that these series were truly stationary in all 
countries and regions, I performed both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron tests. 
The MacKinnon p-values are presented in Table 3 of the Appendix.       
I defined, as a rule, that a given variable would only be taken as stationary if the null hypothesis 
that yields the existence of a unit-root could be rejected at a 5% level in at least one of the two tests. 
Accordingly, Spain is the only country in the entire dataset whose real economic growth and inflation 
are not stationary.  
To tackle the issue of non-stationarity of Spanish data, I started by running the Chow multiple 
breakpoint test for each variable: for real economic growth, the test suggests the existence of a 
structural break in 2008q3 and another one in 2011q2; for inflation, on the other hand, the test points 
to the existence of a first break in 2000q3 and a second one in 2008q2. Figure 3 (see Appendix) 
depicts the evolution of real economic growth and inflation in Spain, as well as the identification of 
these breaks. Aside from the first break underlying the series on inflation, all other breaks seem to be 
related to the economic and financial turmoil triggered by the 2008 crisis. Hence, in order to take these 
breaks into account, the VAR of the dynamic structural model of the Spanish economy also includes 
an exogenous dummy variable. Such dummy variable takes the value 1 between 2008q2 and 2011q2 
and 0 otherwise, thus adding an additional source of explanation to the evolution of real economic 




To obtain the demand and supply shocks for all countries and regions, the VAR for each country 
and region was estimated with a uniform lag of four periods (quarters), such that equation (3) (see 
chapter 4) becomes: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝐷 +  𝐵1 𝑋𝑡−1 +  𝐵2 𝑋𝑡−2 + 𝐵3 𝑋𝑡−3 + 𝐵4 𝑋𝑡−4 +  𝜀𝑡                                                                 (9)  
 This procedure of setting the same lag of the VAR for all countries and regions aims to avoid any 
possible source of disturbance in the results across them. Yet, this choice can be properly justified both 
theoretically and empirically. Firstly, it is reasonable to assume that current real economic growth and 
inflation depend on their evolution over the past year. So, since I am dealing with quarterly data, the 
VAR was estimated with a lag of four quarters. I am aware, however, that one could argue that real 
economic growth and inflation depend rather on their evolution over the past two years for instance 
and, therefore, a lag of eight quarters should have been chosen. Nevertheless, following both the 
Akaike's and the Schwarz' Bayesian information criteria, the optimum lag criteria ranged between 0 
and 6 for the European countries, while for the U.S. regions they ranged between 0 and 3. The values 
for these criteria can be found in Table 4 of the Appendix and, coupled with the use of quarterly data, 
allow to justify the choice over a uniform lag of four quarters. 
Before obtaining the structural demand and supply shocks, different robustness tests were 
performed to ensure the reliability of the estimation results of the VAR. The first one aimed to assess 
whether the residuals of the two equations of the system were normally distributed and, to do so, I ran 
the Jarque-Bera test, whose associated p-values can be found in Table 5 of the Appendix. The results 
for the European countries were, however, remarkably poor, since in only six out of twenty countries 
the residuals from the two equations from the VAR followed in fact a normal distribution (Belgium, 
Denmark, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, as reported in the first column of the above mentioned 
Table). For the U.S. regions, on the other hand, only the residuals from the Far West revealed the same 
result. 
The result presented by the European countries often points to the existence of outliers that 
correspond to one-off, extraordinary economic events that hit different countries, when the VAR may 
be of little use to explain the evolution of the economy in that period
18
. So, the main question is 
whether these outliers reflect exogenous events which are common to most European countries, or 
whether they are essentially idiosyncratic shocks that cannot be explained by the model. If the first 
hypothesis is to be preferred, the common extraordinary event may be the turmoil that followed the 
2008 financial crisis, since the evolution of real economic growth shows a plunge in literally all 
                                                          
18 It can also happen that the number of lags imposed is insufficient to yield satisfactory results. Nevertheless, the 
choice of setting the number of lags equal to four can be duly justified by Akaike's and Schwarz Bayesian's information 
criteria presented in Table 4, which allows to arguably rule this possibility out. 
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European countries in the aftermath of the fall of Lehman Brothers. I used two different approaches to 
isolate this effect: firstly, I estimated the same VAR for all European countries for the period 1997-
2007; secondly, I included a dummy as an exogenous variable in the VAR, which takes the value 1 
between 2008q4 and 2009q1 and 0 otherwise
19
. These two procedures were not applied to the U.S. 
regions, because, aside from the single exception of the Far West, the initial results were already 
strong enough.  
The results from these two approaches are reported in the second and third columns of Table 5, 
respectively, and do show that, once the immediate effects of the financial crisis are taken into 
account, a larger share of European countries starts to have normally distributed residuals. 
Nevertheless, these results must be cautiously analysed. Even though it improves the quality of the 
results, the first approach deletes eight years of data. Therefore, this improvement that is obtained 
might not be due to the fact that the financial crisis of 2008 is no longer included, but the fact that 
country-specific and unexplained shocks occurred mainly as of 2008. This statement can actually be 
reinforced by the results of the second approach. With the inclusion of the dummy variable which 
filters the effects felt in the subsequent quarters to the financial crisis, nine out of twenty countries still 
have non-normally distributed residuals. So, I could not find empirical support to claim that the results 
of the Jarque-Bera test for the European countries were fully generated by the common one-off event 
which was the turbulence triggered by the financial crisis of 2008. Furthermore, since the data do not 
point to the existence of another possible extraordinary event that could impact all European countries 
equally, the poor quality of the results must reflect a majority of specific and significant disturbances 
affecting most countries after 2008. 
Given the fact that these two approaches were also unable to offer reasonable results with respect 
to the normal distribution of estimated residuals, demand and supply shocks were recovered from the 
initial VAR without the dummy variable for the effects of the 2008 financial crisis and using a time 
period ranging between 1997 and 2015. Yet, in the light of these results, the appropriateness of this 
model will be further discussed in the following chapter.  
The final robustness test required the performance of the Breusch-Godfrey test for serial 
correlation of the residuals, also known as the LM test. Indeed, one of the so-called classical 
assumptions of the OLS estimation method imposes that residuals must be uncorrelated at all lags. 
                                                          
19 The dummy variable was included in order to filter the immediate economic effects sparked by the financial crisis of 
2008. This was made after a careful analysis of the evolution of real economic growth in European countries. Despite the fact 
that the actual length of the recession may vary from country to country, this is the choice that best suits the data and, 
therefore, the best point of departure to expunge the short-run effects of such an exogenous event.  
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Then, in the bivariate model which was built, the hypothesis requires the following: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣   𝜀𝑦 𝑡−𝑖  , 𝜀𝑦 𝑡−𝑗   = 𝐶𝑜𝑣   𝜀𝑝 𝑡−𝑖  , 𝜀𝑝 𝑡−𝑗   = 0  , ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗     
Basically, this means that the residuals from both equations of the VAR must be serially 
uncorrelated: past residuals of real economic growth cannot influence future values of these, and the 
same applies to past residuals of inflation. It is important to highlight that this assumption differs from 
another similar one that has been previously laid out. In chapter 4, I stated that demand and supply 
shocks should be uncorrelated at all leads and lags, such that their variance covariance matrix would 
be the identity: 𝑉𝑎𝑟  𝝁𝒕 = 𝑰. More specifically, this means that demand shocks have no ability to 
explain the evolution of supply-side shocks, and vice-versa, because there is no correlation amongst 
them. On the other hand, I claimed that residuals associated to the two estimated equations could be 
correlated, as they are a linear combination of all shocks affecting the evolution of real economic 
growth and inflation. Their variance covariance matrix was then defined as a non-diagonal one: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝜺𝒕 = 𝛀 ≠ 𝑰. In other words, this means that  𝐶𝑜𝑣   𝜀𝑦 𝑡−𝑖  , 𝜀𝑝 𝑡−𝑗   ≠ 0  , ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗. Given this 
explanation, one can understand the difference amongst all these assumptions, as well as the 
hypothesis of no serial correlation of the residuals hereby challenged by the LM test.  
In order to have a better understanding of the subject matter, the LM test requires that the 
residuals from both equations of the VAR representation defined by equation (8) should be estimated 
by OLS through the following equation: 
 𝜀𝑦 𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛾𝑖  
 ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=1 +  𝜑𝑖  ∆𝑝𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=1 +  𝜌𝑗   𝜀𝑦 𝑡−𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 +  𝜈𝑡                                             (10)    
Equation (9) states that the OLS residuals of the first equation of the VAR, which has real 
economic growth as its dependent variable, are regressed in a constant term 𝛼0, in the independent 
variables  ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=1  and  ∆𝑝𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=1   which are part of equation (9) that has previously generated 
them, in 𝑛-lags of the residuals themselves and in a white-noise error term 𝜈𝑡 . The same equation can 
then be applied to the residuals from the second equation of the VAR, which has inflation as its 
dependent variable.  
Ultimately, the test requires that a maximum number of lags 𝑛 be chosen. I defined that the test 
should look for the existence of autocorrelation of residuals up to a lag of eight quarters. My goal was 
then to investigate whether the residuals from the two estimated equations were influenced by the 
residuals from the past eight quarters. If all eight parameters 𝜌𝑗  would prove to be statistically 




The results that were obtained generally point to the absence of autocorrelation of the residuals 
associated to European countries and U.S. regions. Yet, Table 6 of the Appendix indicates all lags that 
had an estimated coefficient 𝜌𝑗  statistically different from zero, ergo suggesting the existence of 
autocorrelation
20
. The most apparently troubling results are the ones that stem from Finland, Italy and 
Spain, where there are three significant lags. Nevertheless, as a rule of thumb, econometricians often 
conclude for the existence of autocorrelation when more than half of the lags is statistically significant. 
Since this is not the case for any European country or U.S. region, the results from the LM test can be 
seen as proof that there is no autocorrelation amongst residuals of the VAR, thus ensuring the 
appropriateness of the model. 
After the two robustness tests were performed and the quality of the estimated VAR was duly 
ensured, I finally recovered structural demand and supply shocks for all countries and regions included 
in the dataset. Since it would be clearly unpractical to plot the evolution of these shocks for all 
countries and regions, I decided to only present a graphical comparison between the Euro Area and the 
United States and their chosen benchmarks - Germany and the Mid-East, respectively -, so that the 
importance of these two anchor regions could be assessed. These two comparisons are depicted in 
figures 4 and 5. Nevertheless, Table 6 yields the correlation coefficients between structural demand 





     
                                                          
20 To run the LM test implies that 243 𝜌𝑗  coefficients be estimated (twenty European countries plus nine regions of the 
U.S., each one of them with eight parameters). Therefore, since it would be impossible to have a single table with all those p-
values, I am only reproducing the (few) ones that were statistically significant.  
21 I am still convinced that the computation of correlation coefficients between the shocks, as done by Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1992a, 1992b, 1994), is not the most appropriate way to draw significant conclusions regarding the similarity of 
business cycles. The presentation of such data (static measures of convergence, as I called them earlier) has merely 
illustrative purposes. 





In the European case, the most interesting feature is given by the right panel of Figure 4, which 
shows a positive and very close relationship between German structural supply shocks and those of the 
Euro Area. Following what has been previously posited with the analysis of Table 1, the data do 
reinforce the importance of Germany in the European economy: not only is real economic growth in 
Germany and the Euro Area highly correlated, as supply-side shocks of the former seem to co-move 
with the same shocks of the latter. The correlation coefficient presented between them is in fact the 
highest in the entire Table 6: 0.8558. As for demand shocks, left panel of Figure 4 shows that, even 
though disturbances to the Euro Area economy often follow the same direction as those to Germany, 
the magnitude of the shocks is different. The correlation between structural demand shocks of 
Germany and those of the Euro Area is lower than the one associated to structural supply shocks: 
0.4496, in spite of being statistically significant at a 5% level, according to Table 6. 
Figure 5 plots the same evolution of structural shocks, but with respect to the United States and 
their chosen benchmark region: the Mid-East. Once again, the data prove that this region is not as 
important to the United States as Germany is to the Euro Area. The argument can be made clearer if 
the right panels of both Figures 4 and 5 are taken into account. Indeed, while supply shocks to the 
Euro Area economy appear to evolve tied to German supply shocks, the direction and magnitude of 
supply shocks to the American economy are not always the same as those of the shocks to the Mid-
East. In fact, the correlation coefficient between supply shocks to the United States as a whole and to 
the Mid-East, though statistically significant, is only 0.4085. Curiously, as in the European case, the 
relationship between demand shocks of the U.S. and those of its benchmark region is much weaker 
than the one defined by supply shocks. In fact, the correlation coefficient is not even statistically 
significant (0.3117). 




If one recalls the theoretical background supporting the identification of these two kinds of 
disturbances, one will certainly recall that while demand shocks were labelled as temporary shocks to 
the level of output, supply-side shocks were taken as permanent disturbances to the economy. 
Following the examples that have been laid out, a demand shock can be seen as the adoption of an 
Table 6: Correlations between structural demand and supply shock of European countries 
and U.S. regions 
 Correlation of structural 
demand shocks 







 0.0130 0.2736* 
Denmark 
+
 -0.0802 0.0875 
Estonia 
+
 -0.0697 0.4295* 
Euro Area 
+
 0.4496* 0.8558* 
Finland 
+
 0.1635 0.4356* 
France 
+
 -0.0421 0.3514* 
Greece 
+
 0.2982* 0.3613* 
Ireland 
+
 0.0535 0.0328 
Italy 
+
 -0.0334 0.5618* 
Latvia 
+
 0.1279 -0.1108 
the Netherlands 
+
 -0.0994 0.5429* 
Portugal 
+
 -0.1730 0.1343 
Slovakia 
+
 -0.0833 0.3477* 
Slovenia 
+
 0.0260 0.5546* 
Spain 
+
 -0.0377 0.2563* 
Sweden 
+
 0.0673 0.3550* 
Switzerland 
+
 -0.0831 0.3829* 
United Kingdom 
+
 -0.1434 0.3638* 
   
Far West 
x
 0.5392* 0.2910 
Great Lakes 
x
 0.7519* 0.5624* 
New England 
x
 0.6677* 0.4710* 
Plains 
x
 0.3247* 0.3162* 
Rocky Mountains 
x
 -0.1094 0.2199 
Southeast 
x
 0.5454* 0.3947* 
Southwest 
x
 -0.3386* 0.0141 
United States 
x
 0.3117 0.4085* 
Notes:  Asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance of the coefficients at a 5% level. 
+ Correlations to Germany 
x Correlations to the Mid-East 
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expansionary monetary or fiscal policy, whose positive effects on the level of output are only felt in 
the short-run, whereas a supply shock may be a favourable technological discovery which allows a 
significant raise in productivity. Hence, this distinction allows to claim that demand shocks are more 
policy driven than supply-side ones. In other words, this means that the former are more sensitive to 
policy choices than the latter
22
.      
If the argument is clear, then the results displayed by Table 6 should come as no surprise. Indeed, 
given the fact that demand shocks tend to reflect different policy choices and since fiscal policy in 
Europe is decided at the national level, demand shocks are barely correlated. Put differently, even 
though the nineteen national fiscal authorities members of the EMU are bounded by the Stability and 
Growth Pact criteria, fiscal policies can be set independently by each one of them and, therefore, there 
cannot be a common European demand shock, nor can demand shocks to the German economy have a 
systematic impact on the economies of its peers. On the other hand, insofar as U.S. regions have also 
to submit to policies decided by a Federal Government, they may experience similar fiscal shocks
23
. 
The fact that the correlation of demand disturbances to American regions is higher and consistently 
more significant than the analogous correlations for European countries can then be properly justified.  
As for supply shocks, since they are not mainly driven by policies, they are more prone to reflect 
exogenous disturbances that affect all economically similar countries and regions at the same time. 
Therefore, the fact that supply shocks are much more correlated than demand-side ones is an expected 
outcome, since despite their differences at the level of policy preferences, European countries and U.S. 
regions still have structural resemblances amongst them. To that extent, it is worth noting that two out 
of the three U.S. regions whose supply shock are not statistically correlated with those of the Mid-East 
are the Rocky Mountains and the Southwest, precisely those which have a more idiosyncratic 
behaviour in terms of real economic growth due to their specific production structures.   
A complete study on the subject of endogeneity of OCA criteria must, however, take these two 
kinds of shocks into account, as they reflect different sources of disturbances to the economy. So, the 
following two sections present the results associated to the evolution of parameter 𝛽 of the state-space 
model in all European countries and U.S. regions for both demand and supply shocks. 
                                                          
22 This does not mean that policy-makers are unable to promote permanent changes in the economy, such as a sustained 
increase in the level of productivity. Surely there are several policies that can achieve such goal. However, my main point is 
that productivity does not respond immediately to the adoption of a given policy, since it takes some time for structural 
changes to produce their desired effects. Output, on the other hand, may respond more quickly to an increase in public 
spending, for instance.  
23 Monetary policy is also a source of demand-side disturbances. Yet, the main difference between European countries 
and U.S. regions lies at the level of fiscal policy, since in both cases monetary policy is set by a common and single monetary 
authority: the ECB and the Fed, respectively. So, monetary policy was purposefully left out of this point I am making. 
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5.2 Dynamic correlation of demand shocks  
One of the main purposes of this dissertation is to add to the existing literature a more dynamic 
measure of correlation of shocks between countries. The state-space model defined by equations (6), 
(7.1) and (7.2) is, to that extent, a helpful tool, because it allows to estimate time-varying coefficients 
that better embrace the dynamic feature of the hypothesis of endogenous OCA criteria under analysis. 
Therefore, the main conclusions this study can draw regarding the latter rely largely on the evolution 
of parameter 𝛽 of the state-space model.  
This section aims to present the results regarding the evolution of 𝛽 that quantifies the 
synchronisation of demand shocks between European countries and Germany on the one hand, and 
U.S. regions and those of the Mid-East on the other. It is worth recalling the econometric methodology 
upon which the following results have arisen: demand shocks were firstly recovered from a SVAR 
model and, afterwards, used as a dependent variable of the measurement equation of a state-space 
model, whose estimation allows to obtain 𝛽. In order to accurately assess its evolution, 𝛽 was 
ultimately regressed in a trend variable (see equation (9)). Ultimately, the validity of the hypothesis of 
endogenous OCA criteria depends on the existence of a statistically significant evolution of parameter 
𝛽 throughout time. In other words, the main issue under analysis in the current thesis comes down to 
the question whether coefficient 𝜃1 of equation (9) is statistically significant. If so, the European 
Commission's and Krugman's views will not be rejected as long as 𝜃1 > 0 or 𝜃1 < 0, respectively. In 
order to ease comprehension, Table 7 summarises all possible results that may arise from the test of 
statistical significance of coefficient 𝜃1, as well as the implications attached to each one of them with 




Table 7: Summary of possible results for the test of statistical significance of 𝜃1 
European dataset American dataset 
Hypothesis Not rejected if ... 
Conclusion if not 
rejected 
Hypothesis Not rejected if ... 
Conclusion if not 
rejected 
H0: 𝜃1 = 0 | t-Statistic | <  1.99 
No endogeneity of 
shocks 
H0: 𝜃1 = 0 | t-Statistic | < 2.021 
No endogeneity of 
shocks 
H1: 𝜃1 > 0  t-Statistic > 1.99 European view   H1: 𝜃1 > 0   t-Statistic > 2.021 European view 
H1: 𝜃1 < 0 t-Statistic < -1.99 Krugman's view H1: 𝜃1 < 0 t-Statistic < -2.021 Krugman's view 
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The values of the test for statistical significance follow a 𝑡 distribution with 𝑛 − 𝑘 degrees of 
freedom, where 𝑛 stands for the number of observations included (76 for the European dataset and 44 
for the American one) and 𝑘 the number of independent variables included in equation (9) that allows 
the test to be run (2 variables in both cases). So, the values of the test for the European countries 
follow a 𝑡 distribution with 74 degrees of freedom, whereas the values for U.S. regions follow a 𝑡 
distribution with 42 degrees of freedom. Therefore, using the critical values of the 𝑡 distribution for a 
significance level of 5%, one can arrive at the critical values yielded by the Table above
24
.  
Table 8 presents the results that stem from the test of statistical significance of coefficient 𝜃1 for 
all European countries and U.S. regions, when the latter assesses the evolution of 𝛽 as a dynamic 
measure of correlation of demand shocks. For the sake of comprehension, European countries were 
divided into four groups following the distinction firstly put forward by Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1992a): a core of Northern and Central Europe countries which essentially comprises Germany's 
closest neighbours (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands); a peripheral group of 
Southern Europe countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) plus Ireland; a group of recently-entrant 
countries from Eastern Europe (Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia); and, finally, a group of EMU-
outsiders (Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). It should be noted that this 
distinction, even though it stems from the seminal work of Bayoumi and Eichengreen, it is slightly 
different from theirs, because it aims to reveal the current political and economic balance in Europe
25
. 
The most striking conclusion one can draw from Table 8 is that the hypothesis of endogenous 
synchronisation of demand disturbances in Europe is not solidly confirmed. In nine out of the nineteen 
(47,4%) European countries, the hypothesis of endogeneity is rejected. Furthermore, it is worth stating 
that the group of European countries for which the hypothesis is rejected (Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia and Switzerland, besides the Euro Area as a whole) is reasonably 
diverse and, therefore, does not have any particular or common feature that can help to justify this 
result. In the U.S., on the other hand, the hypothesis of endogeneity is rejected in three out of eight 
regions (Great Lakes, Plains and the Southwest). So, even though the hypothesis is rejected in 37,5% 
of the cases, one still cannot claim that evidence unmistakably points to its validity. 
                                                          
24 The critical values of the 𝑡 distribution presented in Table 7 were taken from the following table, which can be 
accessed freely: http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/gerstman/StatPrimer/t-table.pdf. The latter was last consulted in November, 14th. 
It is worth stating that the table does not yield the critical values of the distribution for 74 and 42 degrees of freedom. So, 
with no loss of generality, these two were approximated to 80 and 40, respectively. 
25 Denmark, for instance, is now left out of the group of core economies, since I included another one which gathers 
EMU outsiders. Furthermore, by the time Bayoumi and Eichengreen had their work published (1992), Finland was only taken 
as a control country for being part of EFTA. Nowadays, the country seems to belong to the group of core countries due to the 
economic resemblances between German and Finnish economies. 
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The results for the European countries also show another interesting result. For the remaining ten 
countries where the hypothesis of endogeneity of shocks cannot be rejected, there is clearly a 
Table 8: Dynamic correlation of demand shocks 




1.291266 0.2006 No endogeneity 
Belgium -8.128886 0.0000* Krugman's view 
Finland  -1.440984 0.1538 No endogeneity 
France  -2.703653 0.0085* Krugman's view 
the Netherlands  -5.365418 0.0000* Krugman's view 
Periphery 
Greece  -3.117974 0.0026* Krugman's view 
Ireland  -3.928843 0.0002* Krugman's view 
Italy  -0.133431 0.8942 No endogeneity 
Portugal  -0.165515 0.8690 No endogeneity 
Spain  -9.709483 0.0000* Krugman's view 
Recently-entrants 
Estonia  3.295178 0.0015* European view 
Latvia  -0.019855 0.9842 No endogeneity 
Slovakia  -2.907968 0.0048* Krugman's view 
Slovenia  -1.029057 0.3068 No endogeneity 
EMU-outsiders 
Denmark  -0.799850 0.4264 No endogeneity 
Sweden  5.650125 0.0000* European view 
Switzerland  -1.329486 0.1878 No endogeneity 
United Kingdom  6.528986 0.0000* European view 
Euro Area  
Euro Area  -0.509982 0.6116 No endogeneity 
    
Far West  2.313231 0.0257* European view 
Great Lakes  1.365725 0.1793 No endogeneity 
New England  -4.458695 0.0001* Krugman's view 
Plains  0.390142 0.6984 No endogeneity 
Rocky Mountains  -2.195862 0.0337* Krugman's view 
Southeast  2.491011 0.0168* European view 
Southwest  2.014596 0.0504 No endogeneity 
United States  4.284693 0.0001* European view 
 
Note:  Asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance of coefficient 𝜃1 at a 5% level. 
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predominance of Krugman's view. In fact, the only three countries where such view is rejected, 
suggesting instead the more optimistic European perspective, are Estonia, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom: these last two are not even part of the EMU, while the former is one of its most recent 
members. Basically, this means that for a large set of countries which are part of the EMU since its 
beginning (Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain besides recently-entrant 
Slovakia), the results indicate that demand shocks have become more desynchronised with those of 
Germany. This means that the correlation between them has decreased through the EMU experience. It 
is worth mentioning that this specific group comprises most of Germany's closest neighbours. 
 Hence, since demand disturbances are mainly policy-induced ones, this result arises either from 
an increasing desynchronisation of fiscal policies decided at the national level or due to the inability of 
monetary policy set by the European Central Bank to affect all economies equally. Yet, another 
argument can be made in the light of Krugman's reasoning. Indeed, if demand-side shocks to these 
group of European economies has become more desynchronised with those of Germany, one can claim 
that the monetary union promotes inter-industry trade amongst a core of Central and Southern Europe 
countries
26
. Let us assume that due to the monetary and economic integration process most of 
obstacles to intra-European trade are removed and, therefore, through economies of scale and 
knowledge spillovers, Germany's and Ireland's comparative advantages in the production of vehicles 
and pharmaceuticals products, respectively, are highlighted. If this is the case, a fall in the 
consumption of cars will have a negative impact on the German economy, but it will leave the Irish 
pharmaceutical-specialised economy unaffected. So, the increasing desynchronisation of demand 
shocks revealed by this particular group of countries may be explained by the fact that shocks to 
specific industries have been increasing over the past years. 
Briefly, the results that were obtained for European economies show that, aside from the nine 
countries where convergence of shocks has remained constant, there does not seem to be a path of 
convergence of demand shocks to a large set of European countries and those to the German economy. 
Given the fact that EMU member states have their ability to deal with asymmetric disturbances 
constrained, as it was shown in Chapter 2, the increasing desynchronisation of shocks revealed by a 
significant set of countries casts doubt on the prospects of a sustainable European monetary union.     
As for the remaining five U.S. regions where the hypothesis of endogeneity cannot be rejected, 
there is an increasing synchronisation of demand shocks with those of the Mid-East in three of them 
(Far West, Southeast and the United States as a whole) and a divergence of shocks in only two (New 
England and the Rocky Mountains). Like in the European case, there are not obvious and immediate 
                                                          
26 In this particular case only, I am using the term "core" to define the group of Northern, Central and Southern Europe 
countries that is part of the EMU since its first years. It does not have the meaning coined by Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1992a), nor the distinction I have made previously. 
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economic resemblances amongst the regions that comprise each of these two groups, which leaves this 
result unjustified. Nevertheless, while demand shocks to the Euro Area as a whole have not become 
either more or less correlated with those of Germany, there has been an increasing convergence 
between the same kind of disturbances to the Mid-East and the entire United States. This result 
actually reinforces the appropriateness of choosing the Mid-East as the benchmark region of the U.S., 
since data reveal that demand shocks to the region are more prone to explain demand shocks to the 
overall American economy. 
 
5.3 Dynamic correlation of supply shocks  
The study of convergence of supply shocks between European countries, on the one hand, and 
U.S. regions, on the other, is subject to the same methodological framework which was used to 
understand the evolution of the synchronisation of demand shocks. Therefore, the summary of possible 
results given by Table 7 applies as well. Table 9 yields the outcomes of the test of statistical 
significance of coefficient 𝜃1, when the latter measures the evolution of 𝛽 as a dynamic measure of 
correlation of supply shocks. 
Once again, the results for the European countries do not indicate that the hypothesis of 
endogeneity of disturbances can be unequivocally confirmed. In eight out of the nineteen countries, 
the hypothesis is rejected (Austria, Estonia, Euro Area, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia 
and the United Kingdom). I can conclude that there is no general synchronisation of supply shocks to 
European economies to those of Germany, since in nearly 42% of the cases the correlation remains the 
same over time. Interestingly, this is what happens to the relationship between the entire Euro Area 
and Germany. Figure 4 and Table 6 have previously revealed that supply shocks to these two 
economies have always been positively and highly correlated. The results now yielded by Table 9 also 
show that this correlation has not been increasing nor decreasing, but it has remained the same 
throughout the period under analysis.  
For the remaining eleven European countries where the hypothesis of endogenous correlation of 
supply shocks could be rejected, the optimistic European view tends to dominate. Indeed, supply 
shocks have become more synchronised with those of Germany in seven countries (Belgium, Finland, 
Italy, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland), while supply shocks to the other four economies 
(Denmark, France, Ireland and Latvia) have diverged from the ones to the German economy. 
Curiously, this result is different from the one obtained for the endogenous correlation of demand-side 
shocks, where Krugman's view dominated amongst countries for which the hypothesis of endogeneity 
could not be rejected. 
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By construction, supply-side shocks are supposed to reveal more permanent disturbances that 
affect economically similar countries in a fairly equal way. To that extent, one should indeed expect 
Table 9: Dynamic correlation of supply shocks 




0.550068 0.5839 No endogeneity 
Belgium 3.222978 0.0019* European view 
Finland  6.137583 0.0000* European view 
France  -5.313209 0.0000* Krugman's view 
the Netherlands  -1.393620 0.1676 No endogeneity 
Periphery 
Greece  1.759110 0.0827 No endogeneity 
Ireland  -9.597802 0.0000* Krugman's view 
Italy  3.042495 0.0032* European view 
Portugal  0.653477 0.5155 No endogeneity 
Spain  4.187599 0.0001* European view 
Recently-entrants 
Estonia  0.927077 0.3569 No endogeneity 
Latvia  -4.208695 0.0001* Krugman's view 
Slovakia  6.374813 0.0000* European view 
Slovenia  1.141648 0.2573 No endogeneity 
EMU-outsiders 
Denmark  -2.156201 0.0343* Krugman's view 
Sweden  7.632267 0.0000* European view 
Switzerland  6.406385 0.0000* European view 
United Kingdom  -0.784122 0.4355 No endogeneity 
Euro Area 
Euro Area  -0.262884 0.7934 No endogeneity 
    
Far West  10.92840 0.0000* European view 
Great Lakes  -0.430848 0.6688 No endogeneity 
New England  -5.941852 0.0000* Krugman's view 
Plains  -8.604351 0.0000* Krugman's view 
Rocky Mountains 8.554798 0.0000* European view 
Southeast  2.137797 0.0384* European view 
Southwest  4.269776 0.0001* European view 
United States  4.520999 0.0000* European view 
 
Note:  Asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance of the coefficient at a 5% level. 
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that supply shocks to EMU countries ought to become increasingly synchronised. Strikingly, despite 
the existence of a predominance of European view, the results that have been found show that this 
only happens to five EMU member states - Belgium, Finland, Italy and Spain plus recently-entrant 
Slovakia. It is worth recalling that the study of synchronisation of demand shocks showed that there is 
only one EMU country (Estonia) whose demand-side disturbances are in fact converging to those of 
Germany. Thus, both these results cast doubt on the positive effects triggered by the European 
monetary process at the level of correlation of shocks and business cycles. 
The results associated to the study of synchronisation of supply shocks in Europe are more 
baffling from the ones arising from the evolution of demand shocks, since there is no clear trend about 
what the results suggest. Aside from the already mentioned conclusion that the thesis of endogeneity 
cannot be strongly advocated, the results only seem to indicate that some of the positive effects the EC 
expected to be triggered by the monetary integration process have still not occurred.  
On the other hand, the results for the U.S. regions present a much clearer pattern. Firstly, out of 
the eight regions, the hypothesis of endogeneity is only rejected once (12,5%): Great Lakes. As for the 
remaining seven regions, Krugman's view is not rejected in only two (New England and Plains). So, 
the study of convergence of supply-side shocks across U.S. regions does show that there is a majority 
of regions whose supply disturbances tend to become more synchronised with those of the Mid-East 
(Far West, Rocky Mountains, Southeast, Southwest and the United States as a whole). This means that 
the view that the EC laid out about the positive effects sparked by economic and monetary integration 
processes on the correlation of shocks finds empirical support, not in Europe, but in the U.S.. 
Interestingly, this result applies even to regions as Rocky Mountains and the Southwest, whose 
production structures and economic performance are not that much alike the ones presented by their 
peers. Moreover, following a result already obtained in the previous section, one must highlight the 
increasing synchronisation between supply shock to the Mid-East and to the entire American 
economy. Even though the correlation between supply shocks is not as high as the one between 
Germany and the Euro Area, the data suggest that supply shocks to the Mid-East are increasingly 
prone to explain supply shock to the United States as a whole, thus reinforcing the appropriateness of 
choosing the former as a benchmark region. 
The difference amongst the results for European countries and U.S. regions should not be taken 
surprisingly. Indeed, the fact that there is a general movement of synchronisation of supply shocks 
across U.S. regions, while there are only five EMU countries whose supply shock tend to converge 
with those of Germany, may be due to the fact that there are more structural economic resemblances 
amongst U.S. regions than European countries. In other words, despite all their idiosyncrasies, when 
taken altogether, U.S. regions are a more cohesive economic bloc than European countries.  
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5.4 Policy implications for the EMU  
 Can these results shed light on the future of the EMU? Can the United States provide insightful 
lessons for the European monetary union? Interestingly, Eichengreen (2007) argued that the efforts 
made by scholars to draw parallels between the EMU and other monetary unions are more likely to 
mislead than to enlighten, since "where history is useful is not in drawing parallels but in pinpointing 
differences" (Eichengreen 2007, p.1) and the current underlying framework of the EMU has never 
been set before. Despite the appropriateness of the argument, one can still draw relevant conclusions 
for the EMU from the American monetary union, since there are clear resemblances between them: 
according to the terminology put forward by Bordo and Jonung (1999), they are both national 
monetary unions, as there is a single monetary authority common to all members of the union, and 
they are about the same size in population and GDP. Moreover, it is also important to highlight that by 
the time the monetary union was being built in the U.S., this process of integration was threatened by 
cultural, economic and institutional differences between north and south. 
One of the main results of this inquiry has shown that, with respect to the symmetry of demand 
shocks, which are more cyclical in the sense that they are mainly driven by policies, there is a clear 
desynchronisation between a significant group of EMU economies and Germany. For U.S. regions, on 
the other hand, there is no such clear-cut evidence. The first question one should ask himself is why is 
this so? According to Bordo (2004), this may hinge on the fact that real integration in the EMU falls 
short when compared with the experience of the U.S. monetary union
27
. Indeed, in the U.S., even 
though the fifty states retain fiscal independence, tax revenues can also be raised by the national 
Government, which uses part of its receipts to redistribute across states. Cyclical disturbances are 
thereby smoothed by a common fiscal policy set by the federal Government. On the contrary, though 
the European Commission has created several funds with redistributive functions, which aim precisely 
to tackle country-specific economic performances, these are still clearly limited. In fact, the annual 
budget set by the EC only amounts to roughly 1% of its GDP, which prevents one from even talking 
about the existence of a common fiscal policy at the European level. Furthermore, it is also important 
to take into account that a regional negative shock in the United States is largely adjusted by an 
outflow of workers to more prosperous regions, whereas in Europe labour movements remain rather 
sluggish, as pointed out in Chapter 2.    
I follow this argument very closely when I claim that this difference of results amongst the EMU 
and the U.S. stems, not only from the fact that European countries are more prone to be hit by 
asymmetric disturbances in comparison with their American counterparts, but also because they do not 
                                                          
27 Real integration is meant to denote the integration of goods, capital and labour markets, as well as fiscal 
harmonisation and synchronisation of shocks and business cycles across members of the monetary union. 
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have the required instruments to deal with such idiosyncratic shocks. First, they are increasingly 
subject to be hit by asymmetric shock because structural differences between them are much more 
highlighted than amongst U.S. regions. This was shown by the study of the evolution of 
synchronisation of supply shocks.  Second, desynchronisation of demand shocks tends to arise because 
real integration in Europe was not fully achieved. So, if these structural differences across European 
countries are coupled with a short integration in the real side, a common monetary policy defined by 
the European Central Bank cannot be a sufficient mechanism to accommodate specific shocks at the 
country level: one size cannot fit all. Indeed, asymmetric disturbances will invariantly continue to 
appear due to structural and permanent differences between countries, while the latter will remain 
unarmed to tackle them, thus leading to an increasing desynchronisation. 
Therefore, given the structural differences amongst European countries, a sustainable and 
successful European monetary union requires that other policy instruments be at the disposal of 
member states of the union, so that they can tackle increasingly desynchronised demand shocks. To 
that extent, the institutionalising of a system of fiscal federalism, as the one which prevails in the 
United States where fiscal transfers are assigned from the federal Government to deficit states, seems 
to be an appropriate reform to be undertaken by European leaders. On the one hand, a system of 
interregional fiscal transfers would allow countries to have an instrument able to stabilise the level of 
output in response to frequent asymmetric disturbances. On the other, since more fragile countries 
recently had their ability to conduct counter-cyclical policies constrained, it would overcome the fact 
that international capital markets may not be the best risk-sharing mechanism within a currency area.     
Despite its appropriateness, a solution like this cannot be implemented easily. Indeed, as the 
creation of a centralised fiscal authority in Europe requires that part of national fiscal policies be 
delegated to a supranational institution, this implies a large step of political integration that many 
national Governments within the Eurozone may still not want to take. In the U.S., for example, 
furthering real and monetary integration was built upon a firm political base set by the Constitution of 
1789, whereas political will in Europe seems to have lagged behind. Furthermore, Spolaore (2013) 
warned that political integration brings about significant costs when it is pushed forward across 
countries which speak different languages, have different cultures, identities and policy preferences. 
Hence, the ability of European leaders to come up with a solution that is likely to render this 
increasing desynchronisation of demand shocks less harmful for the sustainability of the EMU 
depends largely on the force of political will to push integration forward
28
.  
                                                          
28 The case for a more integrated labour market at the European level could have also been made: if labour movements 
across European countries do increase, then asymmetric shocks can be automatically tackled with outflows of workers from 
the negatively hit countries to the positively hit ones. Yet, I believe a solution like this goes far beyond the scope of 
Economic science, since it also deals with important social and cultural issues that must be taken into proper account. 
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 6. Conclusion 
This thesis aims to assess whether the hypothesis of endogeneity of OCA criterion regarding the 
synchronisation of shocks is verified in Europe. The study was also applied to the American monetary 
union, which served as a standard of comparison.  
A three-step econometric methodology was followed. Firstly, I recovered structural demand and 
supply shocks from the data as suggested by Blanchard and Quah (1989). Secondly, instead of 
building my analysis upon static correlation coefficients across shocks to the several European 
countries and U.S. regions, I estimated a spate-space model, whose ability to yield time-varying 
coefficients allows to have a better approach towards the problem at hand. Demand- and supply-side 
shocks to the several economies under analysis were, therefore, used as dependent variables of the 
state-space model, while structural shocks to Germany and to the Mid-East - the chosen benchmark 
regions for the European and American datasets, respectively - were taken as independent variables. 
The estimated time-varying coefficients could then be interpreted as dynamic measures of correlation. 
Lastly, those same time-varying coefficients were regressed in a trend variable, so that the 
convergence or divergence of shocks amongst the several economies and their benchmark regions 
could be accurately assessed. 
The results showed that, in Europe, the hypothesis of endogeneity could not be unequivocally 
confirmed. The hypothesis of endogenous demand shocks was rejected in nine out of the nineteen 
European countries, while the endogeneity of supply shocks was rejected in eight of them. Conversely, 
the results for the United States were much better. The endogeneity of demand shocks was rejected in 
three out of eight U.S. regions, whereas the endogeneity of supply shocks was only rejected once. 
Other economic and political interpretations were made in the light of the obtained results. For 
the European countries where the hypothesis of endogenous synchronisation of demand shocks was 
not rejected, there was a predominance of Krugman's pessimistic view about the effects of higher 
integration in the correlation of shocks and business cycles: for the nine EMU members where the 
hypothesis was not rejected, in eight of them there was an increasing desynchronisation of demand 
shocks with those of Germany. This result can be particularly alarming in a monetary union where 
prices are sticky, sluggish labour movements cannot work as stabilisation tools, a centralised fiscal 
policy is absent and the use of sovereign fiscal policy is constrained. Given the inability of EMU 
member states to tackle asymmetric and country-specific disturbances, this result calls into question 
the sustainability of the European monetary union as it currently is. An argument in favour of the need 
for fiscal federalism in Europe was, therefore, made.  
A similar result was obtained when studying the evolution of supply shocks across Eurozone 
economies, since the data suggest that there are only five EMU members whose supply shocks are 
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becoming increasingly synchronised with those of Germany. In the United States, on the contrary, out 
of the seven regions where the hypothesis of endogeneity was not rejected, there was an increasing 
synchronisation of supply shocks with those of the Mid-East in five of them. Given the fact these 
supply-side shocks were read as permanent disturbances that affect economically similar regions, these 
two last results were taken as empirical proof that U.S. regions are a more cohesive economic bloc 
than European countries.  
These results must be read in the light of the econometric methodology followed. It was 
highlighted, for instance, that the SVAR model which was used to recover structural demand and 
supply shocks is not free from criticism. Similarly, other schemes to identify the structural shocks 
could have been used: demand shocks could be interpreted as temporary disturbances to 
unemployment or industrial production, while supply shocks could be taken as permanent disturbances 
to the consumer price index. The use of these alternative schemes would also have the advantage to 
increase the number of observations, since all three aforementioned variables are updated on a 
monthly basis, whereas data for real GDP and GDP deflator are only given for at least every quarter.  
The issue regarding the data must be also taken into account. Firstly, I should mention that the 
choice of having data spanning the period 1997q1-2015q4 for a dataset of nineteen European countries 
plus the Euro Area as a whole is entirely mine. I could have had, instead, a smaller sample of 
countries, but with a larger number of observations. Nevertheless, I strongly believe this research 
enterprise was enriched by the fact that the hypothesis of endogeneity of synchronisation of shocks 
was studied, not only in a core of very similar Central Europe economies, but also across very 
different countries from Southern and Eastern Europe.  
These caveats are presented, not only for the sake of transparency, but also because they can lay 
the groundwork for future research. Indeed, if there is a result one should keep from this work is that 
the discussion about the endogeneity of OCA criterion regarding synchronisation of shocks in Europe 
is far from over. There is, in fact, plenty of room for improvement: other schemes for the identification 
of structural shocks can be used, like the aforementioned ones; the number of observations can be 
enlarged, thus strengthening the results; the evolution of the dynamic measure of correlation can be 
assessed with more sophisticated econometric techniques; and other monetary unions, as the Canadian 
one, who shares with the EMU the existence of some language barriers between their English and 
French parts, can be used as useful standards of comparison to draw insightful perspectives to a 
sustainable European monetary union. 
   Though the way to improve upon this work of mine is left wide-open, I sincerely hope that, for 
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